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Bengt  Holmstrom 
Swedish  School of  Economics and Business Administration 
The role of imperfect  information  in a principal-agent  relationship  subject 
to  moral  hazard  is  considered.  A necessary  and  sufficient  condition  for  imperfect 
information  to  improve  on contracts  based on the  payoff  alone is derived,  and 
a characterization  of  the  optimal  use of  such information  is given. 
1. Introduction 
U  It  has  long  been  recognized  that  a problem  of  moral  hazard  may  arise  when 
individuals  engage  in risk  sharing  under  conditions  such  that  their  privately 
taken  actions  affect  the  probability  distribution  of  the  outcome.1  This  situation 
is  common  in  insurance,  labor  contracting,  and  the  delegation  of  decisionmaking 
responsibility,  to  give  a few  examples.  In these  instances  Pareto-optimal  risk 
sharing  is  generally  precluded,  because  it  will  not  induce  proper  incentives  for 
taking  correct  actions.  Instead,  only  a second-best  solution,  which  trades  off 
some  of  the  risk-sharing  benefits  for  provision  of  incentives,  can  be  achieved. 
The  source  of  this  moral  hazard  or  incentive  problem  is  an  asymmetry  of 
information  among  individuals  that  results  because  individual  actions  cannot 
be observed  and  hence  contracted  upon.  A natural  remedy  to  the  problem  is 
to  invest  resources  into  monitoring  of  actions  and  use  this  information  in  the 
contract.  In simple  situations  complete  monitoring  may  be possible,  in  which 
case a first-best  solution  (entailing  optimal  risk  sharing)  can be achieved  by 
employing  a forcing  contract  that  penalizes  dysfunctional  behavior.  Generally, 
however,  full  observation  of actions  is either  impossible  or prohibitively 
costly.  In  such  situations  interest  centers  around  the  use  of  imperfect  estimators 
of  actions  in  contracting.  Casual  observation  indicates  that  imperfect  informa- 
tion  is extensively  used  in  practice  to  alleviate  moral  hazard,  for  instance  in 
the  supervision  of  employees  or  in  various  forms  of  managerial  accounting. 
A natural  question  then  arises:  when  can imperfect  information  about 
actions  be  used  to  improve  on  a contract  which  initially  is  based  on  the  payoff 
alone?  Secondly,  how  should  such  additional  information  be used  optimally? 
This  paper  is  partly  based  on Chapter  4 of  the  author's  unpublished  dissertation,  "On Incentives 
and Control  in  Organizations,"  submitted  to Stanford  University,  December 1977.  It was written 
while  the  author  was visiting  the  Center  for  Operations  Research and Econometrics,  Universit6 
Catholique  de Louvain, Belgium.  An  earlier  version  was presented  at  the  European Meeting  of  the 
Econometric  Society in Geneva, 1978. I am much  indebted  to Joel  Demski, Fr0ystein  Gjesdal, 
Charles  Holloway,  David Kreps,  and  Robert  Wilson  for  many  helpful  discussions  and  to  David Baron 
and Gerald  Kramer  for  detailed  comments  on an earlier  manuscript. 
1  See for  instance  Arrow  (1970),  Zeckhauser  (1970),  Pauly  (1974),  and  Spence and  Zeckhauser 
(1971). 
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A recent  interesting  paper  by  Harris  and  Raviv  (1976)  addresses  these  questions 
in the context  of a principal-agent  relationship  in which  the agent  provides 
a productive  input  (e.g., effort)  that cannot be observed by the principal 
directly.2  Their  results  relate  to  a very  specific  kind  of  imperfect  monitoring  of 
the agent's action. They study  monitors  which provide information  that  is 
independent  of the state of nature  and allows the principal  to detect any 
shirking  by the  agent  with  positive  probability.  Such monitors  are of  limited 
interest,  however,  since  they  are  essentially  equivalent  to  observing  the  agent's 
action  directly,  because a first-best  solution  can be approximated  arbitrarily 
closely in this case.3 Clearly, one cannot expect imperfect  monitoring  to 
possess such strong  characteristics  in  general. 
Employing  a different  problem  formulation  from  Harris  and Raviv's, we 
are able to simplify  their  analysis and generalize  their  results  substantially. 
Both questions posed above are given complete answers (in our particular 
model). It is shown  that  any additional  information  about the  agent's action, 
however  imperfect,  can be used to improve  the  welfare  of  both  the  principal 
and the  agent.  This result,  which  formalizes  earlier  references  to the  value of 
monitoring  in agency relationships  (Stiglitz,  1975; Williamson,  1975), serves 
to explain  the  extensive  use of  imperfect  information  in contracting.  Further- 
more,  we characterize  optimal  contracts  based on such  imperfect  information 
in  a way  which  yields  considerable  insight  into  the  complex  structure  of  actual 
contracts. 
The formulation  we use is an extension  of that  introduced  by Mirrlees 
(1974, 1976). We start  by presenting  a slightly  modified  version  of Mirrlees' 
model  (Section 2), along with  some improved  statements  about the  nature  of 
optimal  contracts  when  the  payoff  alone is observed. In Section  3 a detour  is 
made to show how these results  can be applied to prove the optimality  of 
deductibles  in  accident  insurance  when  moral  hazard  is  present.  Section  4 gives 
the  characterization  of  the  optimal  use of  imperfect  information  and Section  5 
presents  the  result  when  imperfect  information  is valuable. Up to this  point 
homogeneous  beliefs  are  assumed,  but  in  Section  6  this  assumption  is  relaxed  to 
the  extent  that  we  allow  the  agent  to  be more  informed  at  the  time  he  chooses his 
action. The analysis  is brief,  but  indicates  that  qualitatively  the  same results 
obtain  as for  the  case with  homogeneous  beliefs.  Section  7 contains  a summary 
and points  out some directions  for  further  research. 
2. Optimal  sharing  rules  when  the  payoff  alone  is  observed 
*  We study  a principal-agent  relationship,  where  the  agent  privately  takes 
an  action  a E A C R, A being  the  set  of  all  possible  actions,  and  a together  with 
a random  state  of  nature  0,  determines  a monetary  outcome  or  payoffx  = x(a, 0). 
The  problem  is  to  determine  how  this  payoff  should  be shared  optimally  between 
the  principal  and  the  agent.  The principal's  utility  function  is  G(w), defined  over 
wealth  alone, and the  agent's utility  function  is H(w,a),  defined  over wealth 
2 The main  results  of  Harris  and  Raviv  (1976)  are  reported  in  their  1978  paper.  For earlier  work 
on principal-agent  models,  see Wilson  (1969),  Ross (1973), and Mirrlees  (1976). 
3 This fact,  which  is not  observed by Harris  and Raviv (1976), can be verified  by using  an 
argument  similar  to the  one given  by  Mirrlees  (1974,  p. 249), or  by  Gjesdal (1976) (cf.  example  in 
footnote  7). Obviously,  it  implies  that  monitoring,  which  satisfies  Harris  and Raviv's conditions, 
is valuable. This is their  partial  answer  to the  first  question  raised  above. 76  / THE BELL JOURNAL  OF ECONOMICS 
and action. The model is further  restricted  by assuming  that  H(w,a)  =  U(w) 
-  V(a), with  V' >  0 and Xa  >  0.4  The interpretation  is that  a is a productive 
input  with  direct  disutility  for  the  agent  and this  creates  an inherent  difference 
in  objectives  between  the  principal  and the  agent.  It  is convenient  to  think  of  a 
as effort  and this  term  will be used interchangeably  with  action. Since the 
problem  of  moral  hazard  can be avoided when  the  agent  is risk-neutral  (Harris 
and  Raviv,  1976),  we shall  assume  U" <  0. The  principal  may  or  may  not  be risk- 
neutral,  i.e., G" < 0. 
In this  section,  we consider  the case where  the  principal  observes only 
the  outcome  x. Thus, sharing  rules  have to be functions  of  x alone. Let s(x) 
denote the share of  x that  goes to the agent  and r(x) = x -  s(x) denote the 
share that  goes to the  principal.  It is assumed that  both  parties  agree on the 
probability  distribution  of  0  and  that  the  agent  chooses a before  0  is known.5  In 
this  case (constrained)  Pareto-optimal  sharing  rules  s(x) are generated  by the 
program: 
max  E{ G(x - s(x))}  (1) 
s(x),a 
subject  to  E{ H(s(x),a)}  -  Hf,  (2) 
a E  argmax  E{H(s(x),a')},  (3) 
a'eA 
where  the  notation  "argmax" denotes  the  set  of  arguments  that  maximize  the 
objective  function  that  follows.6 
Constraint  (2) guarantees  the  agent  a minimum  expected  utility  (attained  via 
a market  or  negotiation  process). Constraint  (3) reflects  the  restriction  that  the 
principal  can observe  x but  not  a. If  he  also could  observe  a, a forcing  contract 
could  be used  to  guarantee  that  the  agent  selects  a proper  action  even  when  s(x) 
is chosen to solve (1)-(2)  ignoring  (3). The latter  we will  refer  to as thefirst- 
best  solution,  which  entails  optimal  risk  sharing.  It differs  in  general  from  the 
solution  of  (1) subject  to (2) and (3), which  we call a second-best  solution. 
Two approaches  can be used to solve the  program  above. The earlier  one, 
used by Spence and Zeckhauser (1971), Ross (1973), and Harris and Raviv 
(1976), recognizes explicitly  the dependence of x on a  and 0, so that  the 
expectations  in (1)-(3)  are taken  with  respect  to the  distribution  of 0. They 
proceed  to  characterize  an optimal  solution  by  replacing  (3) with  the  first-order 
constraint  E{H  s'  sXa  + H2}  = 0, and then  apply  the  calculus of  variations. 
To  validate these steps one has to assume that  an optimum  exists and is 
differentiable.  However, as an example by Mirrlees  (1974) shows, there  may 
commonly  exist no optimal  solution  among  the class of unbounded  sharing 
rules,  and  for  this  reason  s(x) has to  be restricted  to  a finite  interval  in  general. 
As a result,  the  solution  will  become  nondifferentiable  and  the  above-mentioned 
approach  can no longer  be applied.7 
4 Subscripts  denote  partial  derivatives  with  respect  to corresponding  variables. 
5 This  assumption  corresponds  to  model  1  in  Harris  and  Raviv  (1976),  which  is  the  model  they 
use for  studying  imperfect  information.  We shall  relax  it  in Section  6. 
6 As usual, E denotes the expectation  operator.  Since E{H(s(x),a)}  need not  be concave 
in  a, there  may  exist  multiple  solutions,  hence  the  inclusion  symbol. 
7 Even when  an optimal  solution  exists  among  unbounded  sharing  rules,  it  may  be nondiffer- 
entiable.  This  has  been  observed  by  Gijesdal  (1976).  To illustrate  his  ideas  one can  look  at  the  follow- HOLMSTROM  /  77 
A better  approach to solving  (1)-(3),  which  also gives a more  intuitive 
characterization  of  an optimum,  has been introduced  by  Mirrlees  (1974, 1976). 
He suppresses  0 and views  x as a random  variable  with  a distribution  F(x,a), 
parameterized  by  the  agent's  action.  Given  a distribution  of  0,  F(x, a) is simply 
the  distribution  induced  on  x via the  relationship  x = x(a,  0).8 It is easy to see 
that  xa >  0  implies  Fa(x,  a)  < O.  It  will  be assumed  that  for  every  a, Fa(x,  a) <  0 
for  some  x-values,  so that  a change  in  a has a nontrivial  effect  on the  distribu- 
tion  of  x. In particular,  it  will  shift  the  distribution  of  x to  the  right  in  the  sense 
of  first-order  stochastic  dominance. 
For the  moment,  assume F has a density  function  f(x,a)  with  fa and  fa 
well defined  for  all (x,a).9 Replacing  (3) with  a first-order  constraint  yields 
the  program: 
s(x)E[c,d+x],a  G(x  -  s(x))f(x,a)dx  (4) 
subject  to  I  [U(s(x))  -  V(a)]f(x,a)dx  H,  (5) 
U(s(x))fa(x,a)dx  = V'(a).  (6) 
Note  that  s(x) is  restricted  to  lie  in  the  interval  [c, d + x] to  avoid nonexistence 
of  a solution.10  This  restriction  is  natural  from  a pragmatic  point  of  view  as well, 
since the agent's wealth puts a  lower bound, and the principal's wealth 
(augmented  with  x) an upper  bound  on s(x). 
Let X be the multiplier  for (5) and  tx  the multiplier  for (6). Pointwise 
optimization  of the Lagrangian  yields the following  characterization  of an 
optimal  sharing  rule: 
G'(x - s(x))  fa(x,a)  (  = h + ux  ,  (7) 
U'(s(x))  f(x,a) 
ing insightful  example. Let x(a,z)  = a + z  and z -  Unif(0,1), so that  x -  Unif(a,a +  1). If 
(a*,s*(x))  is a first-best  solution  it is easy to see that  a contract  of  the  form  s(x) = s*(x) when 
x  > a*, s(x) = w otherwise,  will  make  the  agent  choose a = a* for  w sufficiently  low. But  in  that 
case x 2 a* for  all outcomes  of  2, and the first-best  solution  s(x) = s*(x) is effectively  realized. 
In other  words,  a nondifferentiable  sharing  rule,  which  penalizes the  agent  for  outcomes  x <  a*, 
will  give  both  the  principal  and the  agent  the  same expected  utility  as a first-best  solution.  In this 
example  no optimal  differentiable  sharing  rule  exists  for  (1)-(3). 
Gjesdal's analysis shows that  both Spence and Zeckhauser (1971, p. 383, footnote  5) and 
Harris  and Raviv (1976,  pp. 36-37) err  in giving  incorrect  characterizations  (based on the  Euler 
equation)  for  examples  similar  to this. 
We will  avoid situations  like  these  by  essentially  assuming  that  the  support  of  the  distribution 
of  x will  not  change  with  a, as explained  below. For a more  detailed  comparison  of  the  state-space 
approach  with  Mirrlees'  approach,  see Holmstr6m  (1977). 
8  Thus,  it  is always  possible  to  go  from  the  state  space approach  to Mirrlees'  approach,  while 
the  reverse  is not  always true. 
9  In Section  3 we shall  allow discrete  distributions  as well. The crucial  assumption  is thatfa 
exists.  Note that  this  assumption  is not  satisfied  by  the  example  in  footnote  7. 
10  More  precisely,  existence  of  a solution  to (1)-(3)  can be proved  for  the  class of  functions: 
SK  {s(x)  E [c,d + x]  Vb\'(s) < K  (b'  -b)}, 
where Vb' (s) is the total variation  of s in the interval  [b,b'] (Kolmogorov and Fomin, 1970), 
under  some  technical  assumptions  about  integrability  and  the  behavioral  assumption  that  the  agent, 78  / THE BELL JOURNAL  OF ECONOMICS 
for  almost  every  x for  which  (7) has a solution  s(x) E  [c, d + x]; otherwise 
s(x) = c or  d + x, depending  on whether  the  right-hand  side X left-hand  side 
throughout  the  interval.  Furthermore,  tu  is given  as the  solution  to the  adjoint 
equation, 
G(x - s(x))fa(x,a)dx +  t  U(s(x))faa(x,a)dx  -  V(a)  = 0,  (8) 
and a is determined  by (6).11 
From  Borch's (1962)  work,  we know  that  s(x) will  be Pareto  optimal  from  a 
risk-sharing  point  of  view only  if  the  right-hand  side in (7) is constant.  Now, 
falf = k,  aconstant,  implies  0 = f  fa = f  f k = k,  since  f  f=  1  foralla. Hence, 
fa = 0 would  follow,  which  contradicts  the  assumption  that  Fa <  0 for  some  x. 
Consequently,  perfect  risk  sharing  could only  obtain  if  /L  = 0. But,  in  fact,  one 
can prove  the  following:12 
Proposition  1. Assume V' >  0 and F,a  < 0 (with  strict  inequality  for  some x- 
values), then  tL  >  0, or  equivalently:  The principal  would  like  to see the  agent 
increase  his  effort  given  the  second-best  sharing  rule. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Two immediate  corollaries  follow: 
Corollary  1. Under the assumption  of Proposition  1, one has the following 
relationship  between  the second-best  solution  s(x) and the first-best  solution 
sx(x),  for  a given  X: 
{s(x)  - Sx(X),  on  X+ =  {x fa(x,a) >  0}, 
(9) 
s(x) <  s (X),  on  X_ = {x  lfa(x,a) <  0}. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Corollary  2. Under  the  assumption  of  Proposition  1,  the  second-best  solution  is 
strictly  inferior  to a first-best  solution.13 
Proof: See Appendix. 
in  case  he  is  indifferent,  chooses  his  action  according  to  the  principal's  preferences.  By  taking  K 
large  enough,  the  characterization  in  (6)-(8) will  be valid  for  this  solution,  and  SK  will  contain 
all  functions  of  practical  relevance. 
" The  characterization  can  be  proved  rigorously  as in  Holmstrom  (1977)  using  proposition 
9.6.1  in  Luenberger  (1969).  Some  technical  assumptions  which  we  do not  spell  out  are  needed. 
More  important  is  the  fact  that  one  has  to  assume  that  the  agent's  optimal  choice  of  action  is  unique 
for  the  optimal  s(x). This  assumption  seems  very  difficult  to  validate  except  in  specific  problems 
and  regrettably  we  have  to  leave  the  question  about  its  validity  open. 
Mirrlees  (1974)  was  the  first  to  give  a  characterization  of  an  optimum  in  the  form  above  (without 
bounds).  Earlier  Spence  and  Zeckhauser  (1971)  and  Ross  (1973)  gave  alternative  characterizations 
based  on  the  state  space  formulation. 
12 This  proposition  generalizes  Mirrlees'  (1976)  conclusion  that  ,u  > 0 when  fa/f  is  increas- 
ing  in  x. 
13  It  is  worthwhile  stressing  the  difference  between  Corollary  2  and  the  example  in  footnote  7. 
A first-best  solution  can  be achieved  in  that  example  because  fa  does  not  exist  at  the  endpoints 
of  the  uniform  distribution.  Whenever  f, exists,  Corollary  2 indicates  that  a first-best  solution 
cannot  be  achieved.  Also,  note  that  V' > 0  is  essential.  The  role  played  by  V  in  the  characterization 
is obscured  by  the  complexity  of  the  relationships  between  (6)-(8), but  generally  one  expects 
that  the  larger  V"  is,  the  smaller  is  It  and  the  accompanying  welfare  loss. At  an  extreme,  if  V'  = 0  for 
a - a and  V' = oo  for  a > d then  the  first-best  outcome  can  be achieved  since  it  entails  a = a, 
which  the  agent  will  choose  given  an  optimal  risk-sharing  rule. HOLMSTROM  / 79 
The characterization  in (7) has an intuitive  interpretation  in terms  of  de- 
viating  from  optimal  risk  sharing  to provide  incentives  for  increased  effort  on 
the  part  of the  agent. This is accomplished  by taking  s(x) > sx(x) when the 
marginal  return  from  effort  is positive  to the agent,  and s(x) <  sx(x) when  it 
is negative  (see Corollary  1). The incentive  effect  of deviating  from  optimal 
risk  sharing  is stronger  the  larger  is Ifa ,  and it  is more  costly  (in  terms  of  lost 
risk-sharing  benefits)  the  greater  isf.  Thus  fa I  If  may  be interpreted  as a benefit- 
cost ratio  for  deviation  from  optimal  risk sharing,  and (7) states that  such 
deviations  should be made in proportion  to this ratio, with  individual  risk 
aversion  taken  into  account. 
In contrast  to perfect  risk  sharing,  the second-best  solution  is crucially 
dependent  on the  distribution  of  x and its  functional  relation  to  a. This occurs 
because the  outcome  x can be used as a signal  about the  action  which  is not 
directly  observed.  We note  thatfa/f  is  the  derivative  of  the  maximum  likelihood 
function  logf, when  a is viewed as an unknown  parameter.  In this  sensefa/f 
measures  how  strongly  one is  inclined  to  infer  from  x that  the  agent  did  not  take 
the  assumed action,  and (7) says that  penalties  or bonuses (as expressed by 
deviations  from  first-best  risk  sharing)  should be paid in proportion  to this 
measure.  14 
The deviation  from  perfect  risk  sharing  implies  that  the  agent  is forced  to 
carry  excess responsibility  for  the outcome and this  points to the implicit 
costs involved  in  contracting  under  imperfect  information  (Corollary  2). Con- 
sequently,  there  are positive  gains to observing  the agent's action, since in 
that  case a first-best  solution  can be achieved  by  using  a forcing  contract.  This 
provides  the  basis for  discussing  ways to realize part  of  these  gains  by  using 
imperfect  monitoring,  which  is the  subject  of  Sections  4 and 5. 
To illustrate  the  formula  in  (7) and  the  interpretations,  consider  the  follow- 
ing example: G(w) = w,  U(w) = 2/w,  V(a) = a2, x  exp (l/a).  In  this 
example,  the  agent  could  be a machine  repairman,  whose  effort  a will  determine 
the  expected  time  before  the  machine  will  break  down. The monetary  return 
x is proportional  to  the  length  of  time  the  machine  will  remain  operative;  (here 
the  proportionality  factor  has been taken  =  1). 
From  (7), the  optimal  share  is:15 
s(x) =  L  +  ' (x  a)]2  (10) 
a 
and  some  simple  calculations  yield  Au  = a3,  and  the  equation  4a3 + 2X a =  1  for 
a (using  (6) and  (8)). As one would  expect,  u is increasing  in  a, since  it  is more 
costly  to  induce  higher  effort.  The first-best  solution  is  sx(x) = X2,  ax =  1/2X.16 
For a  numerical  solution let h =  /2.  Then s(x) =  4(x +  1/)2,  a =  /2, 
s (x) = 1/4,  ax =  1, as pictured  below. The welfare  measure  for  the  first-best 
solution  is  3/4  and for  the  second-best  it  is 9/16.  (See Figure  1.) In this  example, 
14  Of  course,  this  interpretation  is not  quite  accurate,  since  given  s(x), the  principal  knows 
from  (4)  what  action  a rational  agent  will  take  according  to  the  model.  But  I think  this  interpretation 
corresponds  well  with  reasoning  in  practice. 
15 This  is  an  exceptional  example  in  that  no  bounds  need  to  be  imposed  on  the  sharing  rule, 
and  an  explicit  solution  can  thus  be  obtained. 
16 In this  example  the  question  of  uniqueness,  referred  to  in  footnote  11,  is no  problem. 
For  any  fixed  a, (10)  gives  the  appropriate  solution  to (4)-(6), which  is a relaxation  of  (1)-(3) 
when  a is fixed  at  its  optimal  value.  But  it  is easily  checked  that  s(x) in  (10)  makes  (6) strictly 
concave  in  a, and  hence  the  relaxed  problem  also  solves  the  original  one. 80  / THE BELL JOURNAL  OF ECONOMICS 
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the  penalties  imposed  on the  agent  for  x <  /2,  which  is the  mean  of  x, are rela- 
tively  small  owing  to the  high  values off(x,/2) in  this  region  (and, of  course, 
owing  to risk  aversion),  and bonuses for  x >  2  are correspondingly  large.  In 
view  of  risk-sharing  benefits,  the  convexity  of  the  second-best  solution  may  be 
surprising,  but  this  is in  no way  exceptional  (cf.  Mirrlees  (1976); also in  Wilson 
(1969),  convex  sharing  rules  may  be optimal).  Examples  for  which  sharing  rules 
are concave or  linear  or even two-peaked  can be easily  generated  as well. 
3. Deductibles  in  insurance 
*  The characterization  in (7) can be applied  to the  insurance  setting  to con- 
clude that  optimal  accident insurance  policies necessarily  entail  deductibles 
in  the  presence  of  moral  hazard.  To demonstrate  this,  the  assumption  that  the 
distribution  F(x,a)  possesses a density  function  will  be relaxed. Since (7) is 
derived  via point-wise  optimization,  a mixture  of a continuous  and discrete 
distribution  can  be used  as well,  provided  the  support  of  the  discrete  distribution 
is left  unchanged  by the  action  (cf. footnote  7). In that  case simply  interpret 
f(x,a)  in  (7) as the  probability  mass rather  than  the  value of  the  density  func- 
tion  whenever  x is a mass  point  (and correspondingly  forfa  andfaa,  which  both 
are assumed  to exist  as before). 
Mixed  distributions  are  characteristic  in  accident  insurance.  First,  there  is 
a probability  that  no accident  occurs  and this  generates  a mass point  at  x = 0; 
and  conditional  on  an  accident,  there  is  a damage  distribution  overx <  0,  which 
usually  can be assumed continuous.  If  a represents  a precautionary  action,  it 
is natural  to assume that  this  mixed  distribution  satisfies: 
fa(O,a) >  0,fa(x,a)  <  0.  (11) HOLMSTROM  / 81 
This  assumption  says  that  the  probability  of  an  accident  decreases  with  a so that 
each outcome  x <  0 is  less  likely.  For  instance,  driving  a car  more  carefully  will 
presumably  decrease the  probability  of  both  small  and large  accidents. 
Because tL  >  0 and the left-hand  side in (7) is continuous,  (11) clearly 
implies  that  the optimal  sharing  rule  s(x) is discontinuous  at x = 0. In fact, 
s(O) >  sx(0) > s(x) for  all x <  0, since G'(x - s(x))/(U'(s(x)) is increasing  in 
s(x) and nonincreasing  in x (here Sx is the solution  to (7) with u = 0). If 
d = min,<0  {s(O) - s(x)}  >  0, we can write:17 
s(x)=Ir  '  (  if  x = 0,  (12) 
sk - d - t(x),  if  x <  0, 
where  k is the agent's wealth  after  paying  the premium,  d is the deductible 
which  is paid when  an accident  occurs, and t(x) >  0 is the  agent's additional 
share  in the costs of an accident. One would expect t(x) to be increasing  in 
x. This is the case if,  for  instance,  falf  is increasing  in x (which holds for 
surprisingly  many  standard  distributions;  see Holmstrom  (1977)). 
In many  situations  it  is approximately  true  that  the  agent's  action  will  only 
affect  the  probability  of  an accident  and not  the size of  losses, given  that  an 
accident  occurs. In that  case one can write  f(0,a)  =  1 - p(a), f(x,a)  = p(a). 
g(x), x <  0, where  p(a)  is the  probability  of  an accident  (p'  <  0) and g(x) is 
a damage distribution  independent  of  a. This implies  fa(O,a)/f(O,a)  =  -p'(a)l 
(1 - p(a))  > 0 andfa(x,a)/f(x,a) = p'(a)/p(a)  < 0, forx  < 0. Hencef,/f  is  inde- 
pendent  ofx  forx  < 0,  which  means  that  forx  < 0  we  have  first-best  risk  sharing. 
In particular,  if  the  insurance  company  is risk-neutral,  only  a deductible  will  be 
charged  when  an accident  occurs. 
To summarize  the  discussion  we have: 
Proposition  2. Given  the  assumptions  in  (11),  optimal  accident  insurance  policies 
entail  a deductible.  If the insured's action only  affects  the probability  of an 
accident  but  not  the  size of  damage  and the  insurance  company  is risk-neutral, 
a deductible  alone is optimal. 
This  proposition  lends  additional  support  to  the  frequent  use of  deductibles 
in  accident  insurance.  However,  the  reasoning  is  quite  different  from  that  behind 
the  well-known  proposition  by  Arrow  (1970),  which  holds  that  pure  deductibles 
are always  optimal.  Arrow  does not  consider  moral  hazard  aspects, and in  his 
case deductibles  arise for  instance  if  the firm  uses loading  to determine  the 
premium  (Mossin, 1968). 
4. Optimal  sharing  rules  based on  additional  information 
*  One of  the main  conclusions  from  Section 2 is that  the optimal  solution 
under  moral  hazard is not  first-best  and, hence, that  there  would be gains  to 
observing  the  agent's action  (see Corollary  2 and the  subsequent  discussion). 
Since perfect  observation  of  the  agent's  action  is generally  precluded,  interest 
centers  on the  use of  imperfect  information  for  improvements  of  the  contract. 
This issue can be studied  using  a straightforward  extension  of the model in 
Section  2. 
17 If  x can be observed  only  at  the  option  of  the  insured,  (12) is not  enforceable.  In that  case, 
the  optimal  contract  is  s(x) = max  (x,s(x)), with  s(x) as in  (12).  This  is  still  a contract  with  a deductible. 82 / THE BELL JOURNAL  OF ECONOMICS 
Lety  be  a signal  (possibly  vector-valued),  which  in  addition  tox,  is  observed 
by both  parties  and hence can be used in constructing  the sharing  rule. Let 
F(x,y,a) be the  joint  distribution  ofx and  y  given  a. As in  Section  3,  letf(x,y,a) 
be either  the  value of  the  density  function  of  the  continuous  part  of  F or the 
probability  mass  of  the  mass  point  (x,y), if  such  exists.  As before,fa  andfaa  are 
assumed  to  exist.  The following  extension  of  (7) obtains  for  an optimal  sharing 
rule  s(x,y): 
G'(x  - s(x,y))  fa(x,y,a)  = X  + u  '  ,  (13) 
U'(s(x,y))  f(x,y,a) 
for  almost  every  (x,y) such  that  (13)  has  a solution  s(x,y) E [c, d + x]; otherwise 
s(x,y) = c or  d + x depending  on whether  the  right-hand  side Z the  left-hand 
side throughout  the  interval.  Here tA  is the  multiplier  of  the  agent's first-order 
constraint  and  satisfies  (8) and  a satisfies  (6) (with  obvious  changes  in  notation). 
Again tu  >  0 follows  as in Proposition  1, and consequently  the second- 
best  solution  s(x,y) will  be strictly  worse  than  a first-best  solution.18  The inter- 
pretation  offaf  in  Section  2 can be repeated  for  (13). A new,  important  feature, 
however,  is  thatfa(x,y,a)/f(x,y,a)  may  change  withy.  Thus,  for  the  same  value 
ofx,  but  under  different  contingencies  signalled  by  y,  the  agent  should  generally 
receive  different  remuneration.  In  particular,  if  for  one  value  ofy  it  is  possible  to 
infer  less about a via x, then  the  deviation  from  optimal  risk  sharing  should 
be smaller,  and  vice  versa. At  an extreme,  a realization  of  the  signal  y could  be 
such  thatfa(x,y,a)  0 for  all  x (which  means  that  nothing  about  the  action  can 
be  inferred  from  the  payoff),  and  in  this  case the  optimal  risk-sharing  rule  should 
be employed.  In sharecropping,  for  example,  if  a natural  disaster  destroys  the 
crop, farm  workers  should  not  be held responsible  for  the  outcome (beyond 
optimal  risk  sharing). 
This is quite  intuitive  and corresponds  well  with  observed  practice.  Equa- 
tion  (13) would predict  that  contracts  are elaborate  and contain  a variety  of 
provisions  for unexpected events. Certainly,  there  is substantial  empirical 
support  for  this  conclusion.  Contracts,  at  least  between  external  parties,  tend  to 
be detailed, spelling  out different  responsibilities  in different  contingencies 
(e.g., strikes,  accidents, natural  disasters,  etc.). Not doing so would be in- 
efficient  and  add to  the  implicit  costs  of  contracting.  In the  same way  managers 
are not  held  responsible  for  events  one can observe  are outside  their  control, 
and implicitly  at least, their  performance  is always  judged against  information 
about  what  should  be achievable  given,  say,  the  current  economic  situation.19 
To illustrate  the  point  we can look at an extension  of  the  example  in Sec- 
tion  2. Suppose now  that  the  machine  can also break  down  because of  a failure 
in  a component  over which  the  repairman  has no control.  Let this  event  have 
an exponential  probability  distribution  with constant  parameter  (1/k),  and 
assume  it  is independent  of  the  event  that  the  components  which  the  repairman 
controls  will  break  down.  The  latter  event  still  has  the  same  probability  distribu- 
tion  as before,  namely  exponential  with  parameter  (l/a). 
18 As in  Section  2,  this  result  depends  crucially  on  the  assumption  thatfa  exists  for  all (x,y,a); 
cf.  footnote  13. 
19 Note,  however,  that  internal  labor  contracts  rarely  contain  explicit  reference  to  monitoring 
information,  and  presumably  this  information  is often  unknown  to  the  agent.  Yet such  information 
is and should  be used. The reason  the  principal  (i.e., the  firm)  will  not  default  on such  an implicit 
contract  is its  concern  for  reputation  in  the  labor  market. HOLMSTROM  /  83 
If  it  is not  possible to determine  whether  the  failure  occurred  in a com- 
ponent  outside  the repairman's  control,  the optimal  solution  is to employ  a 
sharing  rule: 
s(x)  =  (+ 
- 
a  kk  I  (14) 
This follows  from  (7), since  x -  exp ((a  + k)lak). 
On the other  hand, if  one can determine  which  component  failed,  this 
information  can be used to improve  the  contract.  Set  y =  1 if  the  failure  was 
outside  the  repairman's  control  andy = 0  otherwise.  Employing  (13),  one  has:20 
s(x,0)  =  +  tk2  --  a  , 
a2  a 
(15) 
s(x,1)  =  X +  /2 
Here  , = a3(1 + (a/k))2,  2 = a3(1 + (a/k))  from (6).  Hence,  tI >  /2, 
indicating  that  it  is more  costly  to induce  a particular  action  a when  y cannot 
be observed. 
The interesting  comparison  is between  s(x,0) and  s(x, 1). One can see that 
s(x,0) is a translation  of  s(x,  1)  to  the  right  as indicated  in  Figure  2. Confirming 
our intuition,  the  repairman  receives higher  pay if  it  is found  that  the  failure 
was  outside  his  control  than  if  it  is  found  that  a component  that  he  controls  failed. 
The optimal  solution  when  y is not  observed will  lie initially  between  s(x,0) 
and s(x,1)  and eventually  go above s(x,1),  since /i >  /2.  Notice that as 
k -> oo,  s(x) -> s(x,0), since  it  becomes all the  less likely  that  the  failure  will  be 
caused by  anything  outside  the  repairman's  control. 
5. Value  of  information 
*  Before  proceeding  with  a discussion  of  the  value of  imperfect  information, 
the  notion  of  a valuable  signal  needs  to  be made  precise.  A signal  y  is said  to  be 
valuable if  both  the  principal  and  the  agent  can be made strictly  better  off  with 
a contract  of  the  form  s(x,y) than  they  are with  a contract  of  the  form  s(x). 
Equation  (13) suggests  that  y will  be valuable  if  and  only  if  it  isfalse that 
fa(x,y,a)  , 
f  = h(x,a) ,  (16) 
f(x,y,a) 
for  almost  every  (x,y). The reason is that  when (16) holds, a contract  s(x) 
will satisfy  (13), whereas if (16) is false, it must  necessarily  take the form 
s(x,y). We shall  prove  this  proposition  formally  below as it  is the  main  result 
of  the  paper  and  no proof  of  (13) was given.  Before  doing  so, let  us rewrite  (16) 
in a way which  allows a surprisingly  simple  interpretation  of this  necessary 
20 Simple  calculations  show  that 
f(x,O,a)  =  1exp  a+k  x 
a  ak 
and 
f,,a),1  f a + k 
f(x,l,a)  = -  exp -  x 
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and sufficient  condition.  Suppose (16) holds  for  all  a. Solving  it  as a differential 
equation  in  a yields 
f(x,y; a)  = g(x,y) h(x,a),  for  almost  every  (x,y),  (17) 
where  h and g can be taken  nonnegative.  Conversely,  (17) implies  (16). Thus 
(16) and (17) are equivalent.21 
Equation  (17) has a natural  interpretation,  since  it  is  precisely  the  condition 
for  a sufficient  statistic,  if  one views  a as a random  parameter  (de Groot,  1970). 
That  is, when  (17) holds,  x is a sufficient  statistic  for  the  pair  (x,y) with  respect 
to  a, which  means  that  x carries  all  the  relevant  information  about  a, and  y  adds 
nothing  to the  power of inference.  The signal  y could only  be used for  risk- 
sharing  purposes,  but  optimal  risk  sharing  is independent  of  the  distribution  of 
the  random  variables  when  agents  have homogeneous  beliefs.  Consequently, 
y  should  be valueless  when  (17)  holds,  which  is  what  (13) says.  On  the  other  hand, 
when  (17) is false,  y contains  some information  about  a beyond  that  conveyed 
by  x. In accordance with  (13),  y should  then  be used in  the  contract  to  improve 
welfare. 
This discussion  suggests  the  following: 
Definition:  A signal  y is said to be informative  about  a when  (17) is false,  and 
noninformative  otherwise. 
With  this  definition  the  main  result  can be stated  as follows: 
Proposition  3. Let s(x) be an optimal  sharing  rule  for  which  the  agent's  choice 
of action  is unique and interior  in  A. Then there  exists a sharing  rule  s(x,y) 
which  strictly  Pareto  dominates  s(x) if  and  only  if  (17) is  false;  or  more  concisely, 
a signal is valuable if  and only  if  it  is informative. 
21 This  is  not  necessarily  true  if  (16)  only  holds  for  a single  value  of  a, because  then  we  cannot 
integrate  (16)  to  get  (17).  Such  an  exceptional  case  is  of  little  interest,  however,  and  in  the  subse- 
quent  analysis,  we  will  only  deal  with  distributions  for  which  (16)  is  true  for  either  all  a or  no  a. HOLMSTROM  / 85 
Proof: Suppose  y  is  noninformative.  Then,  if  s(x,y) is an arbitrary  sharing  rule, 
a sharing  rule  s(x) which  is at least as good as s(x,y) will be constructed, 
establishing  the  claim  that  y is of  no value. 
For every  x, define  s(x) so that 
U(s(x,y))g(x,y)dy = f U(s(x))g(x,y)dy 
= U(s(x))  |g(x,y)dy.  (18) 
Then  using  (17) and (18), 
{U(s(x,y))f(x,y; a)dxdy =  U(s(x,y))h(x; a)g(x,y)dxdy 
=  U(s(x))h(x;  a)g(x,y)dxdy. 
Consequently,  s(x) will result  in the same action and welfare  for  the agent. 
By Jensen's  inequality,  (18) implies 
s(x,y)g(x,y)dy  f s(x)g(x,y)dy, 
or 
(x -  s(x,y))g(x,y)dy  (x -  s(x))g(x,y)dy. 
This implies,  using  Jensen's  inequality  a second time,  that: 
G(x -s(x,y))g(x,y)dy  fG(x  -s(x))g(x,y)dy. 
Since this  is true  for  every  x, and h(x; a) >  0, one obtains,  by  integrating, 
G(x -  s(x,y))f(x,y; a)dxdy  f  G(x - s(x))f(x,y; a)dxdy. 
Since  the  agent  takes  the  same  act  with  s(x) as with  s(x,y) by  construction, 
this  shows  that  the  principal  is at  least  as well  off  with  s(x) as with  s(x,y). The 
agent's utility  is the same for  both  s(x) and s(x,y), and thus  s(x) is weakly 
Pareto  superior  to  s(x,y), which  proves  the  first  part  of  the  proposition. 
To prove  the  second  part,  let  s(x) be  a second-best  solution  with  the  properties 
assumed  in  the  proposition.  Fix  x for  a moment.  Since the  agent's  response  is 
unique  and interior  in  A, the  principal's  and the  agent's marginal  returns  8EP- 
and 8EA-conditional  on  x, from  an additive  variation  8s(x  ,y)  in  the  sharing  rule 
s(x), are [see proposition  9.6.1 in Luenberger  (1969)]: 
8EP = -G'(x  - s(x)) t8s(x,y)f(x,y; a)dy + I  U'(s(x))  8s(x,y)fa(x,y;a)dy, 
8EA =  U'(s(x))  f 8s(x,y)f(x,y; a)dy.  (19) 
Here ,u  is the  solution  to (8) corresponding  to  s(x). 
Suppose y is informative.  From  (16) it  follows  that  there  exists  a set Y in 86  / THE BELL JOURNAL  OF ECONOMICS 
the  range  of  y, with  fyf(x,y;  a)dy  -f(x, Y; a)  :  0, and correspondingly  for 
the  complement  yc,  such  that: 
fa(x,  Y;  f  (x  a)  f(20) 
f(x,Y;  a)  f(x, Y;  a) 
Choose a variation  8s(x,y) such that  8s(x, Y) >  0 and 
s(x,  Y)f(x,  Y; a)  + 8s(x,  YC)f(x,  c; a) = 0;  (21) 
(8s(x,  Y) is constant  for  ally E  Y and correspondingly  for  8s(x,  yc)). From  (19) 
and (21) it  follows  that: 
8EP = /'U'(s(x))[8s(x,Y)  fa(x,Y; a)  + 8s(x,  Y)  fa(x,YC;  a)], 
and 
8EA =  0. 
Substituting  from  (21), we have: 
f(x, Y; a)  f(x, yc;  a) 
6Ee =  pzU'(s(x))'Ss(x,Y)f(x,Y;  a)[f(x,y;  a)  f(x,yc;  a  )  >  O, 
since /u  >  0 (Proposition 1), 8s(x,  Y) >  0 as chosen, and the expression in 
brackets  is  positive  by  (20). The procedure  can be repeated  for  a set  ofx-values 
with  positive  mass,  since  y  is informative,  which  guarantees  that  one can make 
the  principal  strictly  better  off  and the  agent  no worse  off,  for  a small  enough 
variation.  Finally,  utilities  are  continuous,  so part  of  the  principal's  gain  can be 
transferred  to  the  agent  (e.g., use the  same  argument  as above, taking  8EP = 0), 
and this  proves  the  sufficiency  part  of  the  proposition.  Q.E.D. 
Remarks: 
(1) The sufficiency  argument  can be appropriately  modified  to  apply  to  the  case 
where  the  agent's utility  function  H is nonseparable. 
(2) If, for  administrative  reasons, one has restricted  attention  a priori  to a 
limited  class of  contracts  (e.g., linear  price  functions  or instruction-like  step- 
functions),  then  informativeness  may  not  be sufficient  for  improvements  within 
this  class. 
(3) From  the  proof  of  the  proposition  one can see that  iffa/f  is continuous  in 
(x,y), then  there  will  exist  a single  region  Y (independent  of  x) such that  the 
indicator  function  on Y  is  a valuable  signal  whenevery  is.22  This  implies  that  s(x) 
can be improved  upon  by  a dichotomous  contract  of  the  form  (s(x, Y),s(x, yC)), 
which  does not use all the information  contained  in y. Since dichotomous 
contracts  are simpler  to  administer,  this  result  suggests  an explanation  of  their 
frequent  use. 
(4) It  is  clear  that  informativeness  can  be  directly  extended  to  cover  cases where 
one already  observes  a signal  y, in  addition  to  x and is interested  in  the  value 
of an additional  signal  y2. The necessary and sufficient  condition  becomes 
f(x,yl,y2,a)  / h(X,yl,a).g(x,yl,Y2). 
The conclusion  that  a noninformative  signal  will  have  no value may  not  be 
surprising  (even  if  our  terminology  is  chosen  to  make  this  statement  appear  more 
22 The  indicator  function  on  Y  is  a function  which  has  the  signal  y  as  an  argument,  and  equals 
1  on  Y  and  0 otherwise. HOLMSTROM  / 87 
obvious  than  it  is). Basically,  it  tells  us that  pure  randomization  does not  pay. 
The more  important  part  of  the  proposition  is the  result  that  any  informative 
signal,  regardless  of how noisy it is, will have positive value (if costlessly 
obtained  and  administered  into  the  contract).  As in  Harris  and  Raviv  (1978),  one 
might  conjecture  that  in some situations  a sufficiently  noisy,  yet  informative, 
signal  would  add  too  much  randomness  to  the  contract  to  be acceptable  by  risk- 
averse  parties.  But  as the  proof  of  Proposition  3  indicates,  since  both  parties  are 
on the  margin  risk-neutral  towards  randomness  in  y,  given  x, the  new  contract 
can be designed  so that  marginally  it  does not  increase  risk,  but  still  improves 
incentives  for  action.23  Alternatively,  equation  (13)  indicates  that  one  can  improve 
risk  sharing  for  each  y separately  while  at the  same  time  retaining  incentives  for 
action.  This  pointwise  improvement  results,  of  course,  in  an  overall  improvement. 
It is of  interest  to look at a few  special cases of  informativeness.  Suppose 
first  that  y is independent  of  x. This could be the  case if  the  agent  is directly 
monitored  or supervised.  Then we can write 
f(x,y,a)  = h(x,a).g(y,a). 
From  this  it  follows  that 
fa(x,y,a)  h  ha(x,a)  +ga(y,a) 
f(x,y,a)  h(x,a)  g(y,a) 
Hence  y is noninformative  if  and only  if  ga/g  is constant,  which  readily  is seen 
to imply  ga  0 (since  f  ga = 0). Thus, whenever  g depends at all on a, it  is 
informative  and consequently  valuable. Even the  most  casual supervision  of 
an agent  can be used to the  benefit  of  both  parties. 
Second, suppose  y  is informative.  Then  we can construct  another  informa- 
tion  system  as follows: 
y,  if  x < x, 
0,  if  x>x. 
This signal  is a conditional  information  system,  where  resources  are invested 
to find  out  y only  if  the  outcome  is sufficiently  bad (below  x). It is readily  seen 
that  y is also informative  and, depending  on the  costs of  obtaining  y, the  net 
benefits  of  using  y  may  exceed those  ofy.24  Conditional  information  systems  are 
widely  used in practice,  which  indicates  that  their  cost savings  are often  suf- 
ficient  to cover the  information  loss they  engender. 
Finally,  one  can  construct  an  informative  signal  from  y  by  simply  deciding 
randomly  whether  or not  to find  out  y.25  Again,  this  would save costs and is 
quite  effective,  particularly  if  y is a very  precise  signal  about  a 26 
The last two examples  bring  attention  to the  fact  that  Proposition  3 says 
nothing  about  how  valuable  y is, which  would  be important  whenever  costs  for 
information  acquisition  and  administration  of  more  complex  contracts  are  con- 
sidered.  An  upper  bound  for  the  value is, of  course,  provided  by  the  value one 
23 This  line  of  argument  was  first  used  in  Gjesdal  (1976)  for  the  case  where  x and  y  are  inde- 
pendent.  It  has  also  been  used  by  Shavell  (1978),  who  independently  of  us  proves  the  sufficiency 
part  of  Proposition  3,  but  without  employing  the  same  notion  of  informativeness. 
24 Demski  and  Feltham  (1978)  discuss  conditional  information  systems. 
25 Feltham  (1977)  gives  an  example  of  this  kind  of  information  system. 
26 In  the  limit,  ify  = a and  high  penalties  are  allowed,  we  are  very  much  in  the  same  situation 
as in  the  example  in  footnote  7.  An  arbitrary  low  probability  of  checking  y  will  suffice  to  induce  the 
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gets  from  observing  a itself.  As Mirrlees'  (1974)  example  (p. 248)  indicates,  this 
value may  occasionally  be negligible. 
Some indications  of  the  value of  the  signal  can be found  by  studying  (13). 
Roughly  speaking,  the  more  variation  a signal  causes infa/f,  the  more  valuable 
it will  be. This seems difficult  to formalize,  and I believe that  on a general 
level signals  can only be compared  by using  Blackwell's notion  of fineness 
(see Blackwell  (1951) and also remark  4 above). 
6. Asymmetric  information 
*  In many  respects the model we have analyzed is very primitive.  One 
unrealistic  feature  is the  assumption  that  the  agent  chooses his action  having 
the same information  as the  principal,  that  is, before  anything  about 0 is re- 
vealed. Commonly  this  will  not  be the  case. After  the  sharing  rule  is fixed,  the 
agent will often  learn something  new about the difficulty  of his task or the 
environment  in which  it is to be performed.  The following  extension  of our 
model  applies to such  cases.27 
Let z be a signal  about 0 which  the  agent  observes prior  to choosing  a, 
so that  his  choice becomes  a function  a(z).  As before,  we suppress  0 and write 
f(x ,y  ,z  ,a) for  the  joint  density  function,  where  y  is some  additional  information 
observed  by both  parties.  The best sharing  rule  s(x,y) can be determined  by 
solving  the  program: 
max  G(x - s(x,y))f(x,yf(,y  z,a(z))p(z)dxdydz  (22) 
s(x,y),a(z) 
subject  to  U(s(x,y))f(x,y I  z,a(z))p(z)dxdydz 
-  V(a(z))p(z)dz 
> 
H,  (23) 
a(z) E  argmax  f  U(s(x,y))f(x,y  z,a')dxdy  - V(a'),Vz.  (24) 
a'EA 
Here  f(x,y z,a) is the  conditional  density  of  x and y, given  z and the  action 
a, and  p(z) is the  marginal  density  of  z. Letting  ,u(z)p(z)  be the  multiplier  func- 
tion  for  (24) and h the multiplier  for  (23), point-wise  optimization  gives the 
characterization: 
G'(x  -  s(x,y))  t(z)'fa(x,y  z,a(z))p(z)dz 
= X +  (25) 
U'(s(x,y))  \f(x,y iz,a(z))p(z)dz 
This  equation  closely  resembles  equation  (13). Again  the  second  term  on  the 
right-hand  side  indicates  deviations  from  a first-best  solution,  and qualitatively 
one can draw  conclusions  similar  to  those  for  the  earlier  model.  The difference 
is that  the  deviation  from  first-best  risk  sharing  is determined  by a weighted 
average  of  the  incentive  effects  in  the  various  states  z, with  the  weight  uz(z)p(z) 
being  dependent  on the  probability  of  z and the  desirability  (or  cost) of  forcing 
27 This corresponds  to Model 2 in Harris  and Raviv (1976). HOLMSTROM  / 89 
the action  a(z).  It is easy to show that Iu(z)  0 is impossible  (since ,i(z) is 
determined  by  an  equation  similar  to  (8)), and  hence  again  we  have  a second-best 
solution.  However,  we may  have  ,(z)  >  0 for  some  z, and Iu(z)  <  0 for  others, 
since  s'(x) >  1  is possible (cf.  our  repairman  example) in some  x-region. 
The necessary  part  of  Proposition  3,  namely  that  a noninformative  signal  is 
valueless,  extends  readily  to  the  asymmetric  case. Here noninformativeness  is 
defined  by  the  condition: 
f(x,y,z; a)  = g(x,y).h(x,z; a),  for  almost  every  (x,y,z).  (26) 
For the sufficiency  part of the proposition,  an additional  but insignificant 
qualification  is  needed. When  (26) is  false,  that  is,  wheny  is  informative,f,/fwill 
depend  on  y as before.  Yet, when  integrating  as in (25), it  is conceivable that 
the  right-hand  side of  (25) would  become independent  of  y, making  a function 
s(x) optimal  and  y valueless. However, this  is extremely  unlikely  and will  not 
happen  generically;  any  small  change  in  the  problem  data would  take  us out  of 
such  a situation.  Thus, we can safely  say that  for  all that  matters,  Proposition 
3 is also valid  in  the  asymmetric  case. 
7. Concluding  remarks 
*  We have studied  efficient  contractual  agreements  in  a principal-agent  rela- 
tionship  under  various assumptions  about what  can be observed, and hence 
contracted  upon,  by  both  parties.  When  the  payoff  alone  is observable,  optimal 
contracts  will  be second-best  owing  to  a problem  of  moral  hazard. By creating 
additional  information  systems  (as in  cost  accounting,  for  instance),  or  by  using 
other  available information  about the agent's action or the state of nature, 
contracts  can generally  be improved.  A simple  necessary  and sufficient  condi- 
tion for  such imperfect  information  to be of value was given as well as a 
characterization  of  optimal  contracts  which  use such information. 
Principal-agent  relationships  are  prevalent  in  economic  organizations.  The 
analysis  presented  here  improves  our  understanding  of  the  functioning  of  this 
basic organizational  form.  In view of  our  result  that  essentially  any  imperfect 
information  about  actions  or  states  of  nature28  can  be used  to  improve  contracts, 
we have an explanation of the observed complexity  of real contracts  (as 
evidenced  for  instance  in insurance  arrangements).  Additional  information  is 
of  value because it  allows a more  accurate  judgment  of  the  performance  of  the 
agent;  or  viewed  differently,  it  provides  the  same  incentives  for  effort  with  less 
loss of  risk-sharing  benefits. 
Our  analysis  also provides  a basis for  studying  the  design  of  contracts  and 
information  systems  in  more  specific  contexts.  An application  of  this  kind  has 
recently  been  given  by  Baron  and De Bondt  (1978)  in  the  context  of  automatic 
fuel  adjustment  clauses. Other  fields  of applications  have been discussed in 
Harris  and Raviv (1978) and recently  Demski (1977) has used the  model  for  a 
theoretical  study  of  financial  reporting. 
Of  course,  the  analysis  presented  here  leaves unanswered  many  interesting 
questions  in  contracting.  One important  aspect of  the  problem,  which  we have 
28 Note  that  our  analysis  shows  that  from  a theoretical  point  of  view  there  is  no  distinction 
to  be made  between  a signal  which  provides  information  about  actions  and  one  which  provides 
information  about  states  of  nature,  since  these  pieces  of  information  are  inherently  linked  via  the 
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not  considered,  is that  many  contracts  are based on long-term  relationships. 
When  the  same  situation  repeats  itself  over  time,  the  effects  of  uncertainty  tend 
to be reduced  and dysfunctional  behavior  is more  accurately  revealed, thus 
alleviating  the problem  of moral hazard. Such long-term  effects  could be 
analyzed in an extension  of our model. Another  extension  would recognize 
that  asymmetry  of information  as discussed in Section 6 may warrant  a re- 
negotiation  of  the  contract.  One can view management  by objectives  and the 
New Soviet Incentive  Scheme (Weitzman,  1976)  as examples  of  this.  In both 
cases, after  observing  the  difficulty  of  his  task,  the  agent  can  change  the  contract 
within  certain  limits  to the  benefit  of  both  parties.  A preliminary  discussion  of 
this  kind  of  contracting  is  given  in  Holmstrbm  (1977),  where  it  is  seen  as a special 
case of  delegation  of  decisionmaking  responsibility  to an agent  with  superior 
information. 
Appendix 
*  Proof  of  proposition  1. Let s(x) be a second-best  sharing  rule  for  X  >  0 and 
write  r(x) = x - s(x). If  ,u  0, contrary  to our  claim,  then 
G'(r(x))  fa(x,a)  G'(rx(x))  = A + iL'  <  h =  ,  (A1) 
U'(x  - r(x))  f(x,a)  U'(x  - rx(x)) 
for  x E X+ = {x Ifa(x,a) >  0}. Here  rx(x)  is the  first-best  sharing  rule  (in  terms 
of  the  principal's  share),  corresponding  to X;  see Wilson  (1968). Since G'(r(x))l 
U'(x - r(x)) is decreasing  in r(x) for  fixed  x, rx(x)  is an increasing  function, 
and from  (Al) it  follows  that  r(x) >  rx(x)  for  x E X+. 
Correspondingly,  r(x) < rx(x)  on  X_ =  {x Ifa(x,a) <  0}. We have then, 
f G(r(x))fa(x,a)dx >  G(r(x))fa(x,a)dx  >  0,  (A2) 
where  the last inequality  follows,  by first-order  stochastic  dominance,  from 
the  assumption  Fa(x,a) <  0 (with  strict  inequality  for  some  x), and  the  fact  that 
rx(x)  is increasing. 
The expression  in  braces in  equation  (8) is the  second-order  condition  for 
the  agent's  maximization  problem,  and  hence  is <0. (It  cannot  be =0, since  then 
(A2) and (8) would be inconsistent).  Combining  (8) and (A2), this implies 
uL  >  0,  which  contradicts  our  contrapositive  assumption  ,u  0. We  have  arrived 
at a contradiction  assuming  <u  -  0 and conclude that  u >  0. Q.E.D. 
[  Proof  of  corollary  1. The proof  follows  from  Proposition  1  and  the  fact  that 
G'(x  - s(x))lU'(s(x))  is increasing  in  s(x) for  fixed  x. Q.E.D. 
D  Proof  of  corollary  2. The solutions  will  differ  on a set  of  nonzero  measure, 
since u >  0 andfa/f  is nonconstant.  Q.E.D. 
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